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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING*
Edward J Eberle**
Much of the vast literature about the history of due process
discusses whether the due process clause was intended to place sub-
stantive restraints on legislation., Substantive due process has been
one of the most important and controversial American constitu-
tional law doctrines. The purpose of this Article, however, is to
examine that other important aspect of due process-procedure-as
developed by the courts before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.
By 1868, due process had come to connote a certain core pro-
cedural fairness when government moved against a citizen's life, lib-
erty, or property. Due process guaranteed notice, an opportunity to
be heard, and a determination by a neutral decisionmaker according
to some fair and settled course of judicial proceeding. In general,
the decisionmaker was expected to be a jury. These protections
were given shape by early decisions of the Supreme Court and state
courts interpreting the due process clause or historical antecedents.
* I would like to thank Professor Daniel Farber of the University of Minnesota Law
School, who suggested the topic of this Article and reviewed earlier drafts thereof, offering
many useful comments. I am also indebted to Professor W. Douglas Kilbourn of the
University of Minnesota Law School, who was instrumental in arranging my use of the
facilities of the University of Minnesota, where I conducted my research, and who also
provided valuable support at a crucial time. Further thanks go to Professor Werner Ebke of
Southern Methodist University School of Law, who reviewed earlier drafts of the Article and
commented wisely thereon. Copyright 1987, Edward J. Eberle. All rights reserved.
** B.A., Columbia University 1978; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
1982. Mr. Eberle is an Associate at Hinckley, Allen, Tobin & Silverstein, Rhode Island.
1. A sampling of the literature concerning the meaning of due process and whether it
was intended to place substantive restraints on legislation includes: R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 58-115 (1948);
Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1979); Corwin, The Doctrine
of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911); Easterbrook,
Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 85; Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term
"Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect 'Life, Lib-
erty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1890); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 4:339
I
The due process clause derives from two sources of English
law. One source is the famous twenty-ninth chapter of Magna
Carta, which provides:
No Freeman shall be taken, or any otherwise imprisoned, or be disseized of his
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or destroyed; nor
we will not [sic] pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his
Peers, or by the Law of the Land.
2
Conflict has swirled around the precise meaning of the lex ter-
rae or "law of the land" language of chapter twenty-nine. Most
commentators now seem to agree that it meant that freemen could
not be taken, imprisoned, disseized or otherwise harmed except af-
ter a "judgment of the peers" or other determination applying to
the whole body of English law and custom. 3 Most of the law of this
early period was customary law, derived from the ancient Roman,
Norman, Danish, Franconian, and especially Anglo-Saxon peoples,
and the "common law" fashioned by the courts was based on this
customary law.4 Hence, "law of the land" seems to have meant,
originally, the body of decisional, statutory, and especially custom-
ary law that established the manner of proceeding by the monarch
against individuals.
The second source of due process language is an English stat-
ute of 1354: "That no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be,
shall he put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned,
nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in Answer
by due Process of the Law."5 This statute, along with other four-
teenth-century laws, required proper service of notice of an oppor-
tunity to answer personally before a court.6 The "process" intended
here appears to have been a precise, technical reference to the type
of writ that summoned a party to appear in court.7 Hence, process
by writ was designed to secure the personal appearance of a party
before a court so that party could answer in person the charges
against him.
2. The original Latin reads: "Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur aut dissei-
siatur de liberojenemento fuo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus juis aut utlagetur aut
exulet aut aliquo modo destruatur nee super eum ibimus nee super eum mittemus nisi per
legale judicum parium suorum vel per legem terrae." 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225).
3. See, eg., G. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL FoUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 404 (1961);
Berger, supra note I, at 1-4; Corwin, supra note 1, at 368-70.
4. G. SAYLES, supra note 3, at 132-37, 167-91, 224-28, 232-38.
5. 28 Edw. 3 ch. 3 (1354).
6. For an extended discussion of these statutes, see Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Re-
consideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 265 (1975).
7. Id at 268-72.
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Sir Edward Coke identified the "law of the land" with "due
process of law" in his famous Institutes. "[B]y the law of the land
[means] by the due course and process of law," which Coke later
defined as "by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men,
where such deeds be done in due manner, or by writ original of the
Common Law." 8 Coke and other constitutionalists of the 1600s ap-
pear to have enhanced the significance of Magna Carta as a source
of personal liberty in formulating their broader ideology of the com-
mon law, which they used to argue effectively against the preroga-
tives of the Crown.9 Regardless of the accuracy of his historical
research, Coke's interpretation is important because he influenced
the framers of the early state constitutions, early constitutional
commentators, and even the Supreme Court.10
The provision contained in the South Carolina Constitution of
1778 was typical: "That no freeman of this State be taken or im-
prisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or out-
lawed, exiled or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers or by the law
8. E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46,
50 (3d ed. 1669). It now seems clear that "by the law of the land" did not have precisely the
same meaning, originally, as "by due process of law" under early English law. "By the law of
the land" seems to have been a somewhat ambiguous phrase that connoted generally the
whole body of English law and custom governing procedure and over whose meaning En-
glishmen argued for centuries. By contrast, "due process of law" always seems to have been
used to describe the method of summoning parties to court. See generally Jurow, supra note
6. See also Corwin, supra note 1, at 368-69. But see G. SAYLES, supra note 3, at 404: "'By
the law of the and' is another way of saying 'by due process of law' and allows for local
variation in practice."; Shattuck, supra note 1, at 368 (footnote omitted): "[I]t is well settled
that 'due process of law' and 'law of the and' are identical in meaning."
9. Magna Carta heralded a new age in the struggle between the Crown and the opposi-
tion parliamentarians and lawyers because "it put down in black and white the fundamental
medieval doctrine of kingship... that the King existed to promote the welfare of his subjects
and that, if he abused his power, he forfeited his authority and position." G. SAYLES, supra
note 3, at 407. Later, "Sir Edward Coke and others developed a whole field of antiquarian
research [from which 'emerged a broader ideology of the common law'] which they used to
buttress the concept of the balanced constitution, using-or abusing-the myth of Magna
Carta as the foundation stone." L. STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
1529-1642, at 104 (1972). As Sayles comments:
[T]he myth was greater than the reality in the conditions of a later age and, however
much reduced to a caricature of its real self, the Great Charter was at least as
powerful a weapon in the hands of the parliamentarians as it was to those who
forged it.
G. SAYLES, supra note 3, at 399.
10. As noted by Corwin, supra note 1, at 368, Coke's interpretation influenced, among
others, Kent, Story, and Cooley. See eg., 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
13 (12th ed. 1873); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 692 (5th ed. 1891). Even the Supreme Court was convinced of Coke's interpretation.
"The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as
the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Carta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those
words ... says they mean due process of law." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) (citation omitted).
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of the land."11 None of the early state constitutions contained a due
process clause.12 Following the adoption of the fifth amendment,
which was based in part on the state constitutional provisions,13
some states inserted similar due process language in their constitu-
tions. The provision contained in the New York Constitution of
1821 was representative: "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."14
II
Before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court had decided only two cases relating to procedure
under the fifth amendment due process clause: Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Company 15 and Bank of Colum-
bia v. Okely.16 Only Murray's Lessee contained an extensive discus-
sion of the meaning of due process. Several other Supreme Court
cases of this period discussed elements of procedural due process in
connection with dispositions of real and personal property interests:
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,17 Wilkinson v. Leland,18 and Bald-
win v. Hale.19
Murray's Lessee, decided in 1856, contained the Supreme
Court's first extensive discussion of the meaning of due process. In
Murray's Lessee, judgment creditors brought suit against a customs
collector who, according to the Treasury Department, owed the
government about $1.3 million dollars in custom collections. The
Solicitor of the Treasury, acting pursuant to statute, issued a dis-
tress warrant and then seized the collector's property. The question
before the Court was whether the seizure deprived the collector of
his liberty and property without due process of law. The Court held
unanimously that the government's actions did not violate the fifth
amendment, even though the distress warrant gave the collector
only notice of the purpose of the deprivation and the collector re-
ceived no opportunity for a hearing.
11. Constitution of South Carolina-1778, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATEs 3248, 3257 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter THORPE].
12. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 96. See also generally THORPE, supra note 11.
13. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276; Warren, supra note 1, at 440.
14. 5 THORPE, supra note 11, at 7, 2639, 2648. For a discussion of some of the early
state constitutional due process provisions, see Williams, "Liberty" In the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers' Intentions, 53 U. COLO. L.
REV. 117, 121-24 (1981).
15. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819).
17. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
18. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
19. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223 (1864).
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Justice Curtis's scholarly opinion traced the origin of due pro-
cess to Magna Carta. Relying on Coke's authority, he stated that
"the words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to con-
vey the same meaning as. . . 'by the law of the land.' "20 Justice
Curtis explained that the constitutions of the early states (which, he
noted, were adopted before the federal Constitution) followed the
language of Magna Carta more closely and generally contained the
language "but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
Justice Curtis acknowledged that the Constitution did not specify
what constitutes due process. However,
[i]t is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process
which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to
leave congress free to make any process "due process of law," by its mere will.
2 1
To determine whether a proceeding is consistent with due pro-
cess, Justice Curtis set forth a two-step inquiry. First, the Constitu-
tion must be examined to determine whether the process at issue
conflicts with any constitutional provision. If there is no textual
conflict, "those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in
the common and statute law of England" must next be examined.22
Since the process at issue did not violate a specific constitutional
provision, the Court examined English law under the second step of
the inquiry. English law, along with that of many states, authorized
the type of summary, ex parte procedure employed by the Solicitor
of the Treasury to collect the proceeds owed the government. This
procedure "varied widely from the usual course of the common law
on other subjects," and the Court attributed the variation to the
crucial difference between debts due the government, especially
from revenue raising activities, and debts due private parties.23
20. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 277.
23. Id. at 278. In explaining the difference in procedures applicable to the collection of
public and private debts, the Court stressed the government's need to collect revenues: "Im-
perative necessity has forced a distinction between [public tax] claims and all others, which
has sometimes been carried out by summary methods of proceedings, and sometimes by sys-
tems of fines and penalties, but always in some way observed and yielded to." Id. at 282. For
a discussion of Murray's Lessee and the history of the summary, exparte procedure author-
ized by English and American law for the collection of tax debts, see Kirst, Administrative
Penalties and the Civil Jury: the Supreme Court's Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U.
PA. L. Rnv. 1281, 1300-05 (1978). The finding that federal and state governments can resort
to summary procedures in order to assure effective collection of taxes and public revenues has
been confirmed consistently. See, eg., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (ap-
proving provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926 authorizing the summary collection of taxes);
Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905) (upholding a state's exparte
seizure of property from a tax delinquent); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880)
1987]
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In explaining the Court's findings, Justice Curtis articulated
two core principles of procedural due process. First, Justice Curtis
described due process as that which "generally implies and includes
actor [plaintiff], reus [defendant], judex [judge], regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course
of judicial proceedings." Second, Justice Curtis noted that the fore-
going description of due process "is not universally true," as there
may be cases, like the summary process at issue, where the interest
at stake merits less protection than the full procedural safeguards
covered by due process.24 Even in its first extensive discussion of
due process, the Court implicitly recognized that due process is a
flexible concept.
Bank of Columbia v. Okely was the only other Supreme Court
case relating to procedure decided under the due process clause
before the fourteenth amendment.25 In Okely, the Court held that a
statute that granted a bank a summary process by execution against
debtors, who consented to the process in writing, did not violate the
seventh amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial or the due
process clause. The Court's opinion, by Justice Johnson, did not
discuss extensively the meaning of due process, stating only that:
As to the words from Magna Charta... after volumes spoken and written with a
view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to
this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice.2 6
(approving an ex parte seizure of property from a delinquent taxpayer). These cases are
collected and discussed in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 546 n.17 (1978).
24. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 280 (emphasis in original) (citing Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C.
(4 Der.) 1 (1833), rev'd, Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 47 S.E. 961 (1903); Taylor v. Porter,
4 Hill (N.Y.) 140 (1843); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829). For a discussion
of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 59-66, 73-85).
25. One other Supreme Court case was decided under the due process clause before the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment: the now infamous decision of Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court invalidated the Missouri
Compromise, which banned slavery from specified northern portions of United States terri-
tory for, among other reasons, violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, based its decision on substantive due
process grounds:
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense against the laws,
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
Id at 450. This Article will not discuss Dred Scott, and other important substantive due
process decisions, but will instead focus on the growth of procedural due process law. For a
review of Dred Scott and the development of substantive due process law, see E. CORWIN,
supra note 1, at 58-168; J. NOWAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331-
59 (3d ed. 1986); Corwin, supra note 1.
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 244.
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Three other Supreme Court decisions of the pre-fourteenth
amendment period discussed root procedural due process concepts
in the context 6f deciding property issues. In Vanhorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance, the Court held that a state legislature "had no authority
to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in
another, without a just compensation."27 Rather, the state's right
of eminent domain cannot be exercised "without ... [the owner's]
consent, without a hearing, [and] without notice," but must com-
port with essential due process norms by securing the owner's par-
ticipation in determining compensation for the taking.28 According
to the Court, only compensation fixed by a jury or by the owners or
his representative's agreement with the state would assure ade-
quately the owner's participation in the proceeding. This jury de-
termination is a "constitutional guard upon property, and a
necessary check to legislative authority," since the jury will decide
only "after hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties."29
In Wilkinson v. Leland, the Supreme Court relied on Magna
Carta and other basic English law to pronounce:
In a government professing to regard the great rights of personal liberty and of
property, and which is required to legislate in subordination to the general laws of
England, it would not lightly be presumed that the great principles of Magna
Charta were to be disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offense.3 0
The general rule concerning transfers of property required due no-
tice to the parties in interest, followed by a hearing and a judicial
decree affirming the transfer. Rhode Island made an exception for
the sale of a decedent's property in order to satisfy debts of the
estate.31 While "it certainly would be wise and convenient to give
27. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 310.
28. Id. at 315-16.
29. Id. at 315.
30. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 657 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 658-60. The Court based its ruling expressly on Rhode Island law, finding
that:
By the laws of Rhode Island... the real estate of testators and intestaters stands
chargeable with the payment of their debts, upon a deficiency of assets of personal
estate. The deficiency being once ascertained in the probate court, a license is
granted by the proper judicial tribunal, upon the petition of the executor or admin-
istrator, to sell so much of the real estate as may be necessary to pay the debts and
incidental charges. The manner in which the sale is made is prescribed by the gen-
eral laws. In... Rhode Island, the license to sell is granted ... without notice to the
heirs or devisees ....
Id. at 658-59 (emphasis in original). Contemporary Rhode Island law, as well as that of other
states, now requires that notice of a sale of a decedent's land to satisfy estate debts must be
provided to interested parties, including heirs and devisees. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 33-12-4
& 33-12-8 (1984).
In a sense, the question of whether notice needed to be rendered to the heirs or devisees
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notice, where extraordinary efforts of legislation are resorted to,
which touch private rights," the Court sanctioned the sale of dece-
dent's land without any notice to heirs or devisees under color of
Rhode Island law, although it "presumed, after the lapse of more
than thirty years, and the acquiescence of the parties for the same
period, that such notice was actually given."32
In Baldwin v. Hale, the final case of this period, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Clifford concerning the jurisdiction
of one state's bankruptcy court over an out-of-state claimant, pro-
nounced the fundamental due process principle: "Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common jus-
tice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or prop-
erty without notice and an opportunity to make his defense."33 The
further development of procedural due process in the pre-fourteenth
amendment period occurred in the state courts.
III
The state courts, primarily, developed procedural due process
before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. The explanation
for this phenomenon, apparently, is the relative frequency of state,
as compared to federal, legislation restricting individual rights.34
State governments were far more active in curtailing personal lib-
erty and property rights. Since the federal courts generally re-
frained from reviewing such state legislation,35 the state courts
stepped in to protect individual liberties and fill the gap left by the
federal courts' relative inactivity in the area.36
in Wilkinson was wholly of technical importance since "more debts were due in Rhode Island
than the whole value for which all the estate there was sold." 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 659.
32. Id. at 660.
33. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 233.
34. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 25, at 331-35. But see Easter-
brook, supra note 1, at 99: "The Due Process Clause escaped the Court's notice for the same
reason it escaped the Framers': it stated an uncontroversial principle that was expected to be
trivial."
35. Other than the specific constitutional provisions of article I, section 10, clause 1,
which include prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the "impairing
(of) the obligation of contracts," the federal courts had few bases on which to control state
legislation prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, the federal
courts had little opportunity to invalidate state legislation on account of a violation of, or
inconsistency with, federal law. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YOUNG, supra note 25, at
333-35.
36. Throughout history, state courts have often enforced constitutional rights in the
face of the federal courts' withdrawal from or relative inactivity in a particular area. For
example, when the Supreme Court seemed to abandon judicial control of economic legisla-
tion, see, eg., Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (sustaining Missouri stat-
ute providing that an employee could absent himself from his employment without loss of
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Some of the earliest cases decided under the law of the land
clause concerned takings of private property from owners previ-
ously vested with title. Generally, courts held that there could be
no deprivation of property "unless by a trial by Jury in a court of
Justice, according to the known and established rules of decision,
derived from the common law, and such acts of the Legislature as
are consistent with the constitution."37 In the early decision of Bay-
ard v. Singleton, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that prop-
erty confiscated from a British alien during the Revolutionary War
could be validly vested in a United States citizen, observing:
That by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a decision of
his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legislature could take away this
right, and require him to stand condemned in his property without a trial, it might
with as much authority require his life to be taken away without a trial by jury, and
that he should stand condemned to die, without the formality of any trial at
all .... 38
Similarly clear due process tenets arose in Bowman v. Middleton,
where the South Carolina court invalidated a transfer of land ac-
complished pursuant to a legislative act, concluding that
it was against common right, as well as against magna charta, to take away the
freehold of one man and vest it in another, and that, too, to the prejudice of third
persons, without any compensation, or even a trial by the jury of the country, to
determine the right in question.
3 9
The South Carolina court in Zyistra v. Corporation of Charles-
ton,40 also interpreted the law of the land clause to preserve the
common law trial by jury. In Zylstra, the court invalidated an ordi-
nance that prohibited the keeping of a tallow-chandlers shop (soap
pay for up to four hours on election day for the purpose of voting), state supreme courts
relied on state constitutional provisions to enforce desired objectives, see, eg., Heimgaertner
v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955) (refusing to follow Day-
Brite and invalidating, instead, a similar law under the due process clause of the state consti-
tution). Compare also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma
law that prohibited the fitting of lenses to a face or the duplication or replacement of frame
lenses or other optical appliances by persons other than licensed optometrists or ophthalmol-
ogists) with Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 501 (1962) (invalidating California law requiring that applicant opticians have five
years prior experience as prerequisite to obtaining of license as a dispensing optician). More
recently, the Vermont Supreme Court has signalled its intent to use the Vermont Constitu-
tion to protect civil liberties in the face of recent Supreme Court rulings that more narrowly
define personal freedoms. See State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 224, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (1985)
("This generation of Vermont lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity to aid in the formula-
tion of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights and liberties of our
people, however the philosophy of the United States Supreme Court may ebb and flow").
37. Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805).
38. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42, 45 (1787).
39. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252, 254 (1792) (emphasis in original).
40. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (1794).
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and candle-making) within the city limits. According to one judge
the law of the land clause meant the procedures known to the com-
mon law "down to the time of Edw. II," which generally required a
trial by jury in order to validate judgment against a person or his
property.41 That is, "the true import of [the law of the land clause]
was.., to afford a real security to the citizens for the preservation
of this right [trial by jury], and to become an effectual bar to the
innovations of the legislature."42 Accordingly, the court held that
the city's action was invalid.
The final case of this early period, Trustees of the University of
North Carolina v. Foy,43 signaled several pioneer developments in
due process jurisprudence. In Foy, the court invalidated the state's
repeal of its earlier grant of land to trustees for the establishment of
the University of North Carolina. First, the North Carolina court
interpreted the law of the land clause as a general restriction on the
"arbitrary will of the Legislature."44 This mixing of substance and
procedure was a distinctive characteristic of early due process
jurisprudence.45
Second, echoing the principle of judicial review established by
the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, the court next deter-
mined that its role was "to expound and enforce the law and.., to
carry into effect the acts of the legislature as far as they are binding
or do not contravene the constitution."46 That is, the courts, not
the legislature, must make the ultimate determination as to what
constitutes due process.
Finally, the court ruled that the protections of the law of the
land clause accorded "freemen" extended to members of a corpora-
tion as well as to individuals.47 Hence, due process could protect
corporations, trusts and other forms of association, a conclusion not
reached by the Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment
until 1886. 48 Having established these principles, the court ruled:
The property vested in the Trustees must remain for the uses intended for the Uni-
versity, until the Judiciary of the country in the usual and common form, pro-
41. Id at 391.
42. Id at 390-91.
43. 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805).
44. Id at 87-89.
45. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 25, at 336.
46. Foy, 5 N.C. at 88.
47. Id. at 87-88.
48. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886):
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these
Corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.
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nounce them guilty of such acts, as will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their
rights or a dissolution of their body.4 9
An expansion of the class of persons and the types of interests
covered by due process marked the middle period of due process
jurisprudence (1821-1838) before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment. In Marcy v. Clark,50 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed implicitly the finding of the North Carolina
court in Foy that the range of persons covered by due process in-
cluded corporations as well as individuals. In Marcy, the court held
that members of a corporation were liable for corporate debts under
state law, and that one corporate member could not escape liability
by a fraudulent transfer of his corporate shares. The court rejected
the plaintiff's contention that seizure of his property to satisfy cor-
porate debts violated the law of the land clause. The court instead
ruled that due process was satisfied by a judgment obtained against
the corporation, which made all corporate members "virtually de-
fendants in the action" and provided "an opportunity to be heard in
the form they have chosen by joining the company."51
Vanzant v. Waddels2 provided another early indication of the
flexibility of due process. In Vanzant, the court held that the state
could change statutorily the mode of summoning debtors of a bank
to a hearing of claims because the statute
does not give to any court an arbitrary power to seize the estate of the bank, or of
the debtor to the bank, and dispose of it without giving the parties a day in court,
and the means of contesting before a jury all such facts as may be necessary to the
attainment of justice. 53
Because the statute provided a "day in court.., a right to be heard
in defence [sic]; and that no one shall be held liable for the debt
demanded, until a jury has passed upon it," the court ruled that the
legislature could provide legitimately for a summary mode of sum-
moning debtors.54
The Vanzant decision also highights an additional core con-
cern of early due process jurisprudence:
The clause "LAW OF THE LAND," means a general and public law, equally bind-
ing upon every member of the community....
The right to life, liberty and property, of every individual, must stand or fall by
the same rule or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or,
49. Foy, 5 N.D. at 89.
50. 17 Mass. 229 (1821).
51. Id. at 334-35. The court obviously strained to find compliance with due process
norms, even if only by implication, in order to prevent the inequity of a fraudulent transfer.
52. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).
53. Id. at 264-65.
54. Id. at 265.
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"LAND," under similar circumstances .... 55
The court found support for this equal protection component in
Magna Carta, which, the court noted, was adopted as part of the
Tennessee Constitution because of "its value as a fundamental rule
for the protection of the citizen against legislative usurpation."56
The shift from interpretation of the language "due process of
law" or "law of the land" to the terms "liberty" and "property,"
which signaled a broadening of the range of interests captured by
those terms, first appeared in this period. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina, acting again as a precipitator of change in due pro-
cess doctrine, held in Hoke v. Henderson that the right to public
employment as a clerk of court constituted property meriting pro-
tection under the law of the land clause, a landmark ruling that
significantly influenced early due process jurisprudence.57
Concluding upon review of state law that the present clerk of a
county court, Henderson, enjoyed tenure in the office for the term
of his good behavior therein, the court invalidated a statute which
provided for the election of future occupants of the office, pursuant
to which a successor (Hoke) had been chosen. Reasoning that Hen-
derson had a prior vested property right to the office under state
law, the court determined that he could not be deprived of the office
under the law of the land clause "without trial before the judicial
tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right, as determined by
the laws under which it vested, according to the course, mode and
usages of the common law as derived from our fore-fathers."58
55. Id. at 270. The equal protection component of early due process doctrine mandated
that laws must apply generally, that is, to all citizens. Acts designed to bestow particular
benefits to one, but not all, citizens were invalid. See, eg., Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396,
405 (1814): "It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice,
and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages, which are denied to all others under like circumstances .... For a discussion of
the cases developing this doctrine, see Corwin, supra note 1, at 377, 381.
56. 10 Tenn. at 271.
57. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833), rev'd Mial, 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903). In Mial,
the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hoke v. Henderson on the ground that a per-
son appointed to a public office cannot have a property interest in the office, stating that "we
expressly overrule [Hoke] and declare that no officer can have a property in the sovereignty of
the State." 134 N.C. at 162, 46 S.E. at 971. The court was motivated to reverse Hoke in
order to bring the law of North Carolina into conformity with the laws of other states and the
United States. Id. at 139-40, 46 S.E. at 964.
Although no longer valid law, Hoke was an important precedent in the growth of early
due process law, influencing other significant authorities of the pre-fourteenth amendment
period, including Chancellor Kent who recommended the case as "replete with sound consti-
tutional doctrines," see 2 J. KrNT, supra note 10 at 13 n.b., and the Supreme Court, see
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280 (citing Hoke). Accordingly, this article will discuss fully the
aspects of due process raised by the Hoke decision.
58. 15 N.C. at 16 (citing Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) 42 (1787); Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58
(1805)).
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Since Henderson was not dispossessed of the office by means of a
trial by jury, the statute was invalid. In affording due process pro-
tection to government employees, the North Carolina court antici-
pated modem law.
The court also confirmed its earlier determination in Foy that
the courts must determine what constitutes due process and
whether statutes comport with that constitutional norm. While
conceding that the legislature could abolish the office entirely if
public necessity so required, the court ruled that the legislature
could not discharge Henderson at will and transfer the office to
someone else, without complying with due pfocesS. 59 The court
recognized Henderson's reliance interest in the office, acknowledg-
ing his long (twenty-five years) tenure in the office,
to which he has served a long apprenticeship, and to which he has devoted himself,
abandoning other lines of life, or other roads to fortune which were once open to his
free choice. True, he is free to work at other employments; but he is fit for none; he
knows but this.... The loss is therefore undeniable. 60
The Supreme Court of Alabama further expanded the defini-
tion of "property" when it determined in In re Dorsey6l that the
right to practice law as an attorney was a property right. In Dorsey,
the court invalidated a statute providing that attorneys should be
required, as a prerequisite to practicing law in the state, to take an
oath confirming that they had never previously participated in a
duel and would not do so in the future. Because the effect of this
statute was to punish the class of persons desiring to practice law by
depriving them of that right without a trial by jury, the court ruled
the statute unconstitutional.62
One judge believed also that the act violated what, in essence,
would today be called a "liberty interest":
[IThe act.., is contrary to the very scope and design of a free government ... by
preventing the citizen from the pursuit of happiness in his own mode .... And
certainly if [the pursuit of happiness] means anything, it must include the right to
select which of the various avocations or pursuits in life, a young man will engage
in; his future destiny, and his value to the State, as one of its members, demands the
59. Id. at 20-21.
60. Id. at 30.
61. 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838).
62. See, eg., id. at 381-82 (Ormond, J.):
The term "due course of law," has a settled and ascertained meaning, and was
intended to protect the people against privations of their lives, liberty, or property,
in any other mode than through the intervention of the judicial tribunals of the
country.-But, this law seeks to ascertain a fact, . . . not by the judgment of a
competent court, but by the admission of the offender, and construes his silence into
evidence of guilt.
... I think... the law in question, is contrary to the spirit, the plain intent and
meaning of [the due course of law clause].
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utmost freedom of choice; and it is, therefore, of the highest importance, in a free
government, that this right of choice should not be impaired.6 3
Foreshadowing the future "rights-privileges" distinction, the
dissent argued that the state indeed possessed sufficient authority to
regulate the profession, characterizing lawyering as a "license to
practice law, confer[ing] a mere franchise or privilege.... The li-
cense thus obtained, confers no rights in itself."64 The Alabama
court would later recognize the legislature's right to regulate profes-
sions on the basis of the public health and welfare, even if such
regulation affected citizens in the pursuit of their chosen trade.65
63. Id. at 382-83 (Ormond, J.). Judge Ormond conceded, interestingly, that "many of
the objections I have stated are visionary." Id. at 387.
In his opinion, Judge Ormond also compared the oath under review to political test
oaths, which were common in many countries. Commenting on the effect of the act in deny-
ing the right to practice law to those who refused to take the oath, Judge Ormond stated that:
"I am unable to distinguish this, in principle, from the test oaths, which have stained the
statute books of other countries." Id at 383.
64. Id. at 392 (Collier, J., dissenting). Judge Collier commented further that: "this
right [to practice law], when acquired, is at most, a mere privilege to practice that profession,
so long as the attorney shall approve himself worthy of its honors." Id. at 399.
Earlier in this century, there was a distinction in due process law between "rights" and
"privileges." The government could not deny a person a "right" except for specific reasons
that comported with constitutional standards. Privileges of an individual, on the other hand,
could be denied by the government for any reason and without any constitutional restrictions.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's statement that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional
right to practice politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman" has been
commonly thought to articulate the doctrine. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.).
Under the doctrine, many things, including an occupational license, see Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954), and restrictions on who could attend state universities,
see Hamilton v. Regents of The Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), could be labeled mere
"privileges," and not rights subject to constitutional protection. Consequently, the state had
virtually unfettered discretion in its method of disbursing benefits. See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 25, at 453-55. For this reason, primarily, the "rights-
privileges" distinction was ultimately discredited as a constitutional law doctrine. See, eg.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Sherbert v. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
With the Supreme Court's recent rulings that predicate due process protection on the
creation of "entitlements" by state law or other objective sources of law, see, e.g., Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); however,
many commentators now fear the resurrection of the "rights-privileges" distinction. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 354 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 25, at 453-54; Rosenblum, Schoolchildren: Yes, Policemen: No-
Some Thoughts About the Supreme Court's Priorities Concerning the Right to a Hearing In
Suspension and Removal Cases, 72 NW. U.L. REv. 146, 160 (1977).
65. In Mayor of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841), overruled by Mayor of Huntsville
v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55 (1855), the Alabama Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Ormond,
ruled that the state could regulate the weight and price of bread in the public interest, re-
jecting defendant's argument that Dorsey precluded the state from interfering with a citizen's
right to pursue "his lawful trade or calling in the mode his judgment might dictate." 3 Ala.
at 139. Backing away from its reasoning in Dorsey, the court characterized that case as hold-
ing not that the legislature could not regulate a profession, but that the state could not single
out some persons or class of persons for regulation while leaving other professionals unregu-
lated. Id at 140.
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In the last period before the fourteenth amendment, due pro-
cess jurisprudence was influenced significantly by the contest be-
tween state police powers and private rights. The New York courts
played an especially crucial role during this transitional period, par-
ticularly with respect to refining the methodology employed in due
process analysis.
The first key New York case of this period was Taylor v.
Porter,66 where the court invalidated the state's exercise of eminent
domain in authorizing the construction of a private road over the
land of a non-consenting individual. The due process methodology
employed by the Taylor court focused carefully on the intersection
of state and private rights, sustaining exercises of the former only
when achieved in accordance with settled procedural protections.
The court set forth three lines of inquiry, illustrating keenly once
again the close interrelationship between procedure and substance
in formulating due process law during this period.
The court first examined the scope of legislative power, inquir-
ing whether that power extends to "reach the life, liberty or prop-
erty of a citizen who is not charged with a transgression of the laws,
and when the sacrifice is not demanded by a just regard for the
public welfare."67 Reasoning that the sanctity and "security of life,
liberty and property ... lies at the foundation of the social com-
pact," the court concluded that the legislative power does not ex-
tend to "take the property of A ... and give it to B," as "neither
life, liberty nor property, except when forfeited by crime, or when
the latter is taken for public use, falls within the scope of the [legis-
lative] power," a finding based clearly on substantive due process. 68
The court next examined the law of the land clause, which, the
court reasoned, does not mean such law as the legislature may pass,
for that construction "would render the restriction absolutely nuga-
tory, and turn this part of the constitution into mere nonsense."69
Tracing the clause to Magna Carta, the court recited Coke's com-
mentary that "by the law of the land" means "by the due course
and process of law," an interpretation that the court noted was con-
sistent with decisions of other state courts and leading commenta-
66. 4 Hill (N.Y.) 140 (1843). The issue presented in Taylor was novel in that it involved
a state's exercise of eminent domain for a private, not a public purpose. The state appropri-
ated private property for the construction of a private road for one individual. The court
ruled that such state action was unconstitutional, because "a private road cannot be laid out
without the consent of the owner of the land over which it passes." Id. at 148.
67. Id. at'144. The court's concern for the public welfare arose, of course, on account
of the state's exercise of eminent domain.
68. Id. at 145.
69. Id. Accord 2 J. STORY, supra note 10, at 693 (citing Taylor approvingly).
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tors of the period.70 Accordingly,
[t]he meaning of the section then seems to be, that no member of the state shall be
disfranchised, or deprived of any of his rights or privileges, unless the matter shall
be adjudged against him upon trial had according to the course of the common law.
It must be ascertained judicially that he has forfeited his privileges, or that some one
else has a superior title to the property he possesses, before either of them can be
taken from him. It can be done by mere legislation.
7 1
There exists no better statement of the meaning of the law of the
land clause, in a procedural due process sense, in the pre-fourteenth
amendment period.
Finally, the court examined the due process clause because, "if
there can be doubt [under the law of the land clause]. . ., there can
... be none" under the due process clause: "The words 'due pro-
cess of law'... cannot mean less than a prosecution or suit insti-
tuted and conducted according to the prescribed forms and
solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the title to prop-
erty."72 Applying these principles, the court articulated the com-
mon view of due process:
It will be seen that the same measure of protection against legislative encroachment
is extended to life, liberty and property; and if the latter can be taken without a
forensic trial and judgment, there is no security for the others. If the legislature can
take the property of A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself, and either
shut him up in prison, or put him to death. But none of these things can be done by
mere legislation. There must be "due process of law."
7 3
Taylor established that the life, liberty, and property of a per-
son could be abridged only by some form of settled judicial proceed-
ing, usually involving a trial at law.74 There were, of course, certain
exceptions to this general rule of due process jurisprudence, includ-
70. 4 Hill at 146 (citing Hoke, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.). See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
71. 4 Hill at 146.
72. Id. at 146-47.
73. Id. at 147; accord Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 45.
74. Accord T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 356
(1868):
When the government, through its established agencies, interferes with the title to
one's property, or with his independent enjoyment of it, and its act is called in [sic.]
question as not in accordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity by
those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defense which have become estab-
lished in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms of procedure
merely.... Due process of law in each particular case means, such an exertion of
the powers of government as the settled maxims of law sanction, and under such
safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribed for the
class of cases to which the one in question belongs.
See also 2 J. STORY, supra note 10, at 694 (footnote omitted): "[d]ue process of law ... means
such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanc-
tion, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims pre-
scribe for the class of cases to which the one being dealt with belongs."
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ing the state's exercise of eminent domain illustrated in Taylor. In
that context, due process required at least just compensation, deter-
mined pursuant to the owner's participation with the state in fixing
the value of the land.75 In most cases, however, due process man-
dated that some judicial proceeding take place prior to sanctioning
state acts that abridged a person's life, liberty, or property.
The New York Court of Appeals applied Taylor in Westervelt
v. Gregg76 to invalidate a statute insulating the property of married
women from their husbands' common law claims. The rationale
was that the act legislatively deprived husbands of their prior vested
property right in their wives' legacies, without the legal proceedings
established for the protection of private rights.77 Taylor and Wes-
tervelt illustrate graphically how the New York courts came to view
the due process clause as a bulwark of substantive protection for
private rights, "against all mere acts of power, whether flowing
from the legislative or executive branches of the government,"
which implicated those rights but did not comply with the proce-
dural requirements of due process. 78 From a substantive perspec-
tive, the New York view of due process held that once private rights
were established validly pursuant to existing law, those rights could
not later be extinguished by legislative acts alone. Viewed proce-
durally, due process required application of some judicial proceed-
ing before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could be
sanctioned.
Other authorities did not go as far as the New York courts in
interpreting the due process clause as a source of substantive protec-
tion for private rights. The decision of the South Carolina court in
State v. Simons79 represented a more conventional view of due pro-
cess during this period. In Simons, the court overturned a statute
that imposed a fine or forfeiture on any slave owner who returned a
slave to the state after having traveled with the slave in any north-
ern state. Judgment under the statute was rendered by a judicial
proceeding of "two magistrates and five freeholders" and not the
standard common law trial by jury of twelve peers.So The law of the
land clause, the court reasoned, mandated application of the com-
mon law trial by jury of twelve men before any deprivation of
75. 4 Hill at 143, 147. See also Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 31-33.
76. 12 N.Y. 202 (1854) (citing Taylor, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 140 (1843)).
77. See also White v. White, 5 Barb. (N.Y.) 474,484 (1849) (citing language and ration-
ale of Taylor for invalidation, on due process and natural law grounds, of a statute that
removed disability of married women in the control of their property under common law).
78. Westervelt, 12 N.Y. at 212.
79. 29 S.C.L. 639, 2 Spears 761 (1844) (citing Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 382 (1794).
80. Id. at 645, 2 Spears.
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property.8
During the decade 1846 to 1856 at least sixteen states passed
anti-liquor laws that prohibited, in essence, the sale, storage, or pro-
duction of liquor for non-medicinal purposes. Most courts upheld
these laws on the ground that they were valid and reasonable exer-
cises of legislative power that did not deprive persons of their prop-
erty without due process of law.82 However, two state courts-the
New York Court of Appeals in Wynehamer v. People 83 and the In-
diana Supreme Court in Herman v. State 84 and Beebe v. State 85-
held the laws destroyed liberty and property rights in liquor without
due process of law. Furthermore, one state court-the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Fischer v. McGirr 86--recognized a
state's right to legislate in this area, but declared violative of due
process certain procedural sections of the Massachusetts law be-
cause they deprived persons of their property without a trial by jury
and without even an opportunity to be heard and to confront
witnesses.
Wynehamer is commonly viewed as a key precedent in the
growth of substantive due process doctrine.87 Nevertheless, there
are also important procedural due process considerations contained
in Wynehamer. Relying on Taylor v. Porter, Hoke v. Henderson,
and other authority, the Wynehamer court affirmed the general
New York rule that private rights, once established, may be
abridged not "by a legislative act which aims at their destruction,"
but only "where they are held contrary to the existing law, or are
forfeited by its violation.., in the due administration of the law
itself, before the judicial tribunals of the state."88 In other words,
due process "must be understood to mean that no person shall be
deprived, by any form of legislation or governmental action, of
either life, liberty or property, except as the consequence of some
judicial proceeding, appropriately and legally conducted." 89 There
81. This somewhat modem requirement that a trial by jury must consist of twelve men
was not altered explicitly until 1970 when the Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 79 (1970), recognized that the unanimous decision of a six-person jury in all but capital
cases was constitutionally proper.
82. Corwin, supra note 1, at 466, 471-75.
83. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
84. 8 Ind. 545 (1855).
85. 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
86. 67 Mass. (I Gray) 1 (1854).
87. Seeeg., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 25, at 336; Ely, Consti-
tutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 417 (1978). For an
extensive discussion of Wynehamer, see Corwin, supra note 1, at 467-75.
88. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 393.
89. Id. at 434.
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exists no clearer statement of the procedural meaning o'f the due
process clause during the pre-fourteenth amendment period.
The court went on to explain the key role played by the judici-
ary in formulating due process law:
It is plain, therefore, both upon principle and authority, that these constitu-
tional safeguards [the law of the land clause and the due process clause], in all cases,
require a judicial investigation . . . confined to the question whether, under the
preexisting rule of conduct, the right in controversy has been lawfully acquired and
is lawfully possessed.9 0
Furthermore, the
change [in English law from the law of the land clause to the due process clause]
shows that the object of the provision [the due process clause] was, in part at least,
to interpose the judicial department of the government as a barrier against aggres-
sions by the other departments. Hence, both courts and commentators in this coun-
try have held that these clauses, in either form, secure to every citizen a judicial
trial, before he can be deprived of life, liberty or property.9 1
Due process thus connotes the process persons are entitled to re-
ceive when their life, liberty, or property are placed in jeopardy by
state actions. "The better and larger definition of due process of law
is, that it means law in its regular course of administration through
courts ofjustice."92
The Wynehamer court recognized also that due process does
not "necessarily import a jury trial."93 In a criminal case, the court
noted, due process required "an arraignment, formal complaint,
confronting of witnesses, a trial, and regular conviction and judg-
ment."94 When forfeiture of property is a part of the punishment,
as in Wynehamer, an ordinary judicial proceeding, including trial
by jury, is required.95 But most equity proceedings render depriva-
tions of property without a trial by jury.96 At a minimum, however,
due process requires "the right to answer and contest the charge,
and the consequent right to be discharged from it unless it is
proved."97
Finally, Wynehamer continued the trend of expanding the
property concept. The court considered intoxicating liquors to be
90. Id. at 395.
91. I at 433 (citing Hoke, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833); Taylor, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 140 (1843).
92. Id. at 395 (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 425.
94. Id. at 454.
95. Id.
96. Id at 425.
97. Id. at 443; accord 2 J. STORY, supra note 10, at 694: "When life and liberty are in
question, there must in every instance be judicial proceedings; and that requirement implies
an accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribunal with proper jurisdiction, and a convic-
tion and judgment, before the punishment can be inflicted."
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property (and "all property is alike in the characteristic of inviola-
bility") because "[flrom the earliest ages they have been produced
and consumed as a beverage, and have constituted an article of
great importance in the commerce of the world. In this country the
right of property in them was never.., for an instant questioned."98
In Beebe v. State, the Indiana court also held that an anti-li-
quor law was unconstitutional because it deprived persons of their
property rights to liquor without due process of law. Property in-
terests, including rights to liquor, are not subject to "the unlimited
power of the legislature," the court reasoned, and cannot be
abridged "without a remedy therefor by due course of law, that is, a
legal trial in court." 99 In the companion case, Herman v. State, the
Indiana court also held that the state prohibition law was invalid as
an invasion of liberty:
We lay down this proposition, then, as applicable to the present case, that the
right of liberty and pursuing happiness secured by the constitution, embraces the
right, in each compos mentis individual, of selecting what he will eat and drink, in
short, his beverages, so far as he may be capable of producing them, or they may be
within his reach, and that the legislature cannot take away that right by direct
enactment. lOO
In general, however, courts of this period did not interpret liberty
expansively. 10 The view of liberty expressed by the Supreme Court
of Vermont better typifies the period: "The liberty, spoken of in our
bill of rights, is the liberty of the person of every subject."102
The doctrines developed by the New York courts, and espe-
cially Wynehamer, were considered quite novel. The conservative
view of due process articulated by the Rhode Island court in State v.
Keeran 103 was more representative of the era. In Keeran, the court
sustained the state's anti-liquor law, dismissing the defendant's due
process argument, based on Wynehamer, as "admitt[ing] of no such
vague and general application" and disparaging it as
98. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 384-85; accord Beebe, 6 Ind. at 513; Fischer, 67 Mass. at 33.
99. 6 Ind. at 512.
100. 8 Ind. at 558.
101. See, eg., Parker v. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136 (1865) (compulsory military enrollment
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law); Nott's Case, 11 Me. 208
(1834) (commitment to a poorhouse does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law). But see 2 J. STORY, supra note 10, at 698 (footnote omitted):
The [liberty] rights thus guaranteed are something more than the mere privileges of
locomotion; the guarantee is the negation of arbitrary power in every form which
results in a deprivation of right.... The word [liberty] ... embraces all our liber-
ties-personal, civil, and political. None of them are to be taken away, except in
accordance with established principles; none can be forfeited, except upon the find-
ing of legal cause, after due inquiry.
102. Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 361 (1855).
103. 5 R.I. 497 (1858).
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the loose habit of taking constitutional clauses, which, from their history and obvi-
ous purpose, have a well-defined meaning, away from all their natural connections,
and, by drawing remote inferences from them, of pressing them into the service of
any constitutional objection with the ingenuity or fancy of the objector may con-
trive or suggest.1° 4
Of due process, which the Rhode Island constitution limited to
criminal cases, the court stated:
Surely, if any clause in the constitution has a definite meaning, which should ex-
clude all vagaries which would render courts the tyrants of the constitution, this
clause, embodying, as it does, with improvements, the precious fruits of our English
liberty, can claim to have, both from its history and long received interpretation. It
is no vague declaration concerning the rights of property, which can be made to
mean anything and everything .... 105
With these prohibition cases, the development of procedural
due process before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment came
to a close. The next period of major development in due process
law would occur after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
primarily through decisions of the Supreme Court.
IV
What is perhaps most striking about the pre-fourteenth amend-
ment authorities is the relative simplicity and coherence of the
methodology employed in due process analysis. Best articulated by
the Supreme Court in its decision of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co.,106 the prevailing methodology of the
era stipulated that when private rights were placed in jeopardy by
state actions, the Constitution must first be examined to determine
whether a guarantee more specific than due process existed.107 If no
such textual guarantee existed, "those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England"
must be examined.108
Since the interests at issue frequently derived no protection
from specific constitutional provisions, the second step of this meth-
104. Mia t 504-05, 507. Keeran was actually the second time the Rhode Island court was
faced with the question of the validity of the state's prohibition law. The Keeran court con-
firmed its initial decision in State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858), that the law was valid.
105. Id. at 505.
106. For a discussion of Murray's Lessee, see supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
107. The seventh amendment guarantee of a trial by jury was the most frequent constitu-
tional provision called into question by the due process cases. This right was usually sub-
sumed within the predominant due process methodology, resulting in the requirement of a
jury trial before deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest could be legitimized. See,
e.g., Wynehamer v. People; In re Dorsey; Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston.
In cases of eminent domain, a just compensation constitutional clause was often impli-
cated. See, eg., Taylor, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 140 (1943).
108. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277.
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odology was generally employed to find that the interests could be
abridged only by following some form of settled judicial proceeding,
usually involving a trial at law. This second step of the inquiry re-
ceived its clearest articulation in New York decisions, which as-
serted that "no member of the state shall be disfranchised, or
deprived of any of his rights or privileges, unless the matter shall be
adjudged against him upon trial had according to the course of the
common law"109 and that "no person shall be deprived, by any
form of legislation or governmental action, of either life, liberty or
property, except as the consequence of some judicial proceeding,
appropriately and legally conducted."11o
In looking to "those settled usages and modes of proceeding
existing in the common and statute law of England" courts ruled
almost without exception that a jury trial, conducted "according to
the known and established rules of decision, derived from the com-
mon law, and such acts of the Legislature as are consistent with the
constitution,""' was the procedure necessary to validate depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property. Indeed, the only case of this era in
which the holding of a jury trial was not set forth as a prerequisite
to abrogation of a life, liberty or property interest was Murray's
Lessee, where the Supreme Court concluded that the common law
authorized the type of summary, ex parte procedure employed to
collect proceeds owed the government.
Leading commentators and other authorities of the period rec-
ognized, at least theoretically, that the process due in due process
analysis was somewhat flexible and did not necessarily always re-
quire a jury trial.112 Chancery, maritime, military, and other equi-
109. Taylor, 4 Hill (N.Y.) at 146.
110. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 434.
111. Foy, 5 N.C. at 88.
112. See, eg., 2 J. STORY, supra note 10, at 691-92:
The meaning of the phrase "due process of law" has been barely alluded to in an-
other place, in which it is said in effect to affirm the right of trial according to the
process and proceedings of the common law [citing State v. Simons]. Without
doubt it does affirm this in very many cases... in which it is admissible to take
property without giving any trial in the courts, and by modes somewhat arbitrary;
and there are also cases in which persons may be deprived of liberty and even of life
by other process than that of the common-law courts, and which, nevertheless, is
"due process" for the special cases and under the special circumstances. To say,
therefore, that due process of law implies a right of trial according to the course of
common law, is to take our general definition of the principle from that which,
though its [sic] ordinary, is not its universal application, and consequently is in
danger of leading us into error.
Accord id. at 694 (citing Wynehamer and Westervelt):
Different principles are applicable in different cases, and require different forms and
proceedings: in some, they must be judicial; in others, the government may inter-
fere directly and exparte; but due process of law in each particular case means such
an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and
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table courts historically rendered decisions affecting private rights
without a trial by jury.113 Similarly, certain interests, such as the
collection of public debts illustrated in Murray's Lessee, could legiti-
mately be affected without conducting a jury trial. Yet, while au-
thorities of the era recognized this flexibility in principle, the courts
almost invariably called for a jury trial when faced with specific due
process issues. This is the most striking difference between these
early decisions and those today.
All of the pre-fourteenth amendment authorities looked to his-
tory, to "those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in
the common and statute law of England" and, as its procedural law
developed, of the United States, for application of appropriate pro-
cedures. These courts clearly found no warrant for devising proce-
dures to gauge affected interests outside the context of the
Constitution or the common law. The courts were mainly con-
cerned with establishing root and, hence, mainly traditional proce-
dural protections for what were primarily fundamental rights and
interests. Given the fundamental nature of the interests at issue and
the relative stability and coherence of the society of this period,
moreover, there seemed little need to look beyond historical sources
for suitable procedures. This historical methodology was not
changed until 1884, when the Supreme Court recognized in
Hurtado v. California 114 that the range of process of law was not
limited by history, but could progress with changing societal
conditions.
In employing the due process methodology of the period,
courts engaged in a relatively simple one-step process of determin-
ing the requirements of due process. There was no concerted at-
tempt to separate the question of what specific interests were
entitled to due process protection from the question of what process
was due. Due process was not limited to real or personal property,
but also protected other interests, such as continued government
office. Both constitutional questions were answered with reference
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those
maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one being dealt with belongs.
But see id: "When life and liberty are in question, there must in every instance be judicial
proceedings; and that requirement implies an accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribu-
nal with proper jurisdiction, and a conviction and judgment, before the punishment can be
inflicted."
113. For a discussion of these courts and the means employed by them to reach deci-
sions, see Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. at 391-94. A more modem discussion of historical common law
courts, which reached decisions by means other than through a trial by jury, can be found in
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458-59 (1977).
114. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). For a discussion of Hurtado v. California, see Easterbrook,
supra note 1, at 102-03.
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to historical notions of fairness or natural law principles. The key
determination for these early courts was really whether a particular
interest merited due process protection, for due process almost al-
ways meant a jury trial. Today, the seventh amendment right to a
civil jury is often considered an historic relic, while due process is
considered a fundamental right. Before 1868, however, the two
concepts were thought to be inseparable.
A final valuable contribution by these early courts was their
articulation of the core values embraced by the due process concept.
Given shape by the early decisions discussed above, due process
came to mean reasonable notice to those whose rights were impli-
cated by state actions, followed by a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in defense of one's rights, and provision of a fair and neutral
proceeding to determine ultimately the status of the rights at issue.
This core of basic personal, procedural rights constituted the impor-
tant legacy of the early precedents. Accordingly, when the four-
teenth amendment was adopted in 1868 the Supreme Court
inherited a strong foundation from which to fashion national law.
